22 October 2012

Dear Mr. Hudson,

In our Representation to the Planning Inspectorate National Infrastructure Directorate, dated May 2012, page 34, a number of questions were raised in relation to the BW45 incident on 18.06.11.

4.4.61 Mott Macdonald state that compressed air was placed in BW45 in 1911(49,) Why was compressed air placed in BW45 in 1911, as it was not common practice at that time? Also, why did ICI have it on their list for annual monitoring, as it has a salt rock roof?

4.4.65 On the morning of the 18th June, it was observed that the adjacent well BW78 was emitting brine. This raises the question why was this previously stable well affected?

Halite in Comments on Local Impact Reports, Relevant Representations, Written Representations and Comments on Responses to the Examining Authorities First Round of Written Questions, Document Ref. H3 fail to respond to these questions.

In their response at 3.770, Halite does not answer the questions raised.

ICI Chemicals and Poymlers Ltd. were not in the habit of spending money on costly sonar surveys and annual monitoring in the case of brinewells with salt rock roofs, so why did they do so in the case of BW45?

Why was BW 45 abandoned, without being fully worked out, as was the practice at the time?

BW 45 and BW78 are not known to be interconnected, why then was BW78 also emitting brine early on the morning of June 18th?

(49) Assessment of Brinwell Incident Subsurface Aspects, Mott MacDonald, November 2011
Mott MacDonald's investigation into the blow out at BW45 was assessed by information from their sonar survey of June 2010 and past I.C.I. records. If an in-depth study of existing information had taken place previously, this incident could have been averted.

BW45 and BW78 are in an area of close proximity to the route of the gas interconnector, haul road and electrical connector, surely these matters need further investigation?

Yours Sincerely,

D. S. Jackson.