



## SPR EA1N and EA2 PROJECTS

### DEADLINE 5 - RESPONSES TO APPLICANTS COMMENTS AT D4 ON SASES WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS SUBMITTED AT D1

Interested Party: SASES    PINS Refs: 20024106 & 20024110

Date: 3 February 2021

Issue: 1

#### Introduction

1. The following responses are made on the Applicants' Comments on SASES' D1 submissions [\[REP3-072\]](#) which are SASES' Written Representations in respect of Traffic and Transport, Development Consent Order, Safety, Noise and Landscape & Visual. Given the delay by the Applicants in commenting on SASES Written Representations, which were published on 6 November 2020, SASES has only responded by exception since, other than Safety, all these topics have been discussed to some degree in Issue Specific Hearings in respect of which SASES has made post hearing submissions.
2. The fact that SASES has not responded to any particular comment made by the Applicants does not mean that SASES agrees with the comment. SASES will continue to rely on its Written Representations and its subsequent submissions.

#### Safety

3. Please see Appendix 1

#### Landscape and Visual

4. Please see pages 1 & 2 of Landscape Briefing Note 6 prepared by Michelle Bolger attached at Appendix 2.

## **APPENDIX 1**

### **Safety**



## Applicants Response to SASES Deadline 1 Submission –[PINS Reference REP4-23]

### Safety

	Concerning	Response by Applicant	SASES Comment
1.	Consultation with HSE	The Applicant now claims consultation with HSE, but states HSE have made no comment.	Applicant continues to evade the point that no reference to discussion of safety issues with HSE was presented within the EIA.
2.	Hazard Assessment	It was the Applicant that referenced COMAH legislation. Applicant now states that Construction (Design& Management) Regulations 2015 require the Applicants to ensure that all hazards associated with the design are identified and suitably mitigated. Continual design risk assessment shall be conducted throughout the design cycle of the onshore cable system.	SASES had acknowledged that COMAH regulations as referred to in EN-1 were not really applicable to this programme, but were seeking some evidence that all risks to public safety during the operational phase of the programme had been addressed. The Applicant still fails to accept that the design cycle is already underway and has not published even an outline risk assessment and mitigation paper. SASES notes the Applicant's response now includes the verb form "shall" – generally interpreted as a 'mandatory' provision.
3.			N/C
4.			N/C
5.	Safety wrt Construction Traffic	Refers to OCTMP [REP3-032 & REP036]	These documents will be scrutinised to determine whether SASES concerns regarding the adverse effect upon residents safety as a consequence of increased HGV and LGV movement has been adequately addressed.
6.	Safety wrt Construction Traffic	Refers to OCTMP [REP3-032 & REP036], and final CTMP and Travel Plans	States that final CTMP and Travel Plan will ensure there is "...no <b>significant</b> adverse impact on road users..." when SASES comment is that the real requirement should be: .. <b>no adverse impact on road users</b> .
7.	Ingress of Moisture	Applicant states that the cable system is fully sealed against moisture.	The Applicant seems to have forgotten that the subterranean cable sealing ends require circuit breakers and conductors to interface with the Overhead Transmission lines. Is this part of the enterprise fully sealed?



8.	Operational Phase Safety	The Applicant considers two paragraphs in the Environmental Statement (paras 576 & 577) an adequate response to SASES concerns regarding onshore cable and substation(s) safety.	It should be noted that the Applicant considers just two paragraphs (in a document spanning nearly 600 paragraphs) to be an adequate response to safety concerns.
9.	Fire and Explosion Risk	The Applicant refers to a Distributed Temperature Sensing element within the cable systems and that the cable systems are designed to fault to earth safely.	The Applicant again fails provide any indication of the response time to safely detect cable fault/failure. Further , the Applicant states that HVAC cables systems are <b>designed</b> to fault to earth. In practice, a short circuit to earth is not a design feature but the likely outcome of an insulation failure.
10.	Transformer failures	Applicant acknowledges that the probability of fire/explosion in a SGT/Shunt Reactor is low, and that the Applicant shall rigorously assess hazard, risks etc	SASES notes acceptance by the Applicant that it <b>shall</b> rigorously assess assess hazard, risks etc. Use of the verb form is taken to mean acceptance of a mandatory requirement.
11.	Fire	The Applicant claims that fire mitigation systems focus on preventing .....The fire mitigation measures will include appropriate active and passive mitigation startegies	While “ <b>prevention</b> ” rather than “ <b>mitigation</b> ” is to be commended, some explanation of what constitutes passive and active mitigation is required. The Applicant’s response still fails to address what response would be required of the local <u>volunteer</u> Fire Service in the case of a fire in any part of the operational substation(s) and cable corridor.
12.	Emergency Lighting	Applicant states “Reference to emergency lighting for onshore substations is not stated within the Application.	The Applicant notes that “Repair/maintenance – task related flood lighting will be necessary. Attention is is drawn to para 548 of Chapter 06, Project Description, where as exceptions to the agreed working hours, lists: “ Activity necessary in the instance of an <b>emergency</b> where there is risk to person, delivery of electricity or property” Para 30 of Chapter 25 refers to an <b>emergency</b> generator but not the nature of the emergency for which the generator is required. The need for emergency lighting is viewed a reasonably foreseeable.



13.	Fire Precautions	Applicant states there is no intention to utilise the SUDS ponds as a firewater reservoir	Applicant evades the concerns raised by SASES that there appears to be no water reservoir on site for fire fighting as is in other similar substations: no explanation is given of any other firefighting measures to be resident at the substation site.
14.	Lack of a management plans to address possible leaks of SF <sub>6</sub> insulant gas	Applicant explains reasons for using SF <sub>6</sub> . Applicant now includes provision agreeing to the mandatory inclusion of a leak management plan	Reasons for using SF <sub>6</sub> is not contested by SASES. SASES pleased to see that the Applicant now accepts that a leak management and reporting system <b>shall</b> be included and detailed within project specific plans and procedures.
15.	Risk of major accident or disaster	Applicant refers to COMAH 2015 provisions and that no dangerous substances are involved with substation realisation	Applicant still fails to provide any numerical or anecdotal evidence to support the claim that <b><i>"... the risk of major accident and/or disasters occurring associated with any aspect of the project during construction , operation and decommissioning phases is negligible...."</i></b> SASES has always accepted that COMAH provisions are largely inappropriate to this undertaking, but have the view that the transmission of high voltage / high current was not <b>without</b> risk, however small. What is missing in the Applicant's response is some indication of how <b>small</b> is <b>"negligible"</b> from the Applicant's perspective. The Applicant could easily have cited experience gained on EA1 construction.

## **APPENDIX 2**

**Landscape Briefing Note 6 prepared by Michelle Bolger**



## ***Landscape Briefing Note 6***

*Project:* 1080 East Anglia One North and East Anglia Two  
*Date:* 2<sup>nd</sup> February 2021  
*Purpose:* Notes responding to SPR's Deadline 4 submissions  
*Reference:* 1080 BN06 Responses to Deadline 4 submissions final .docx

***EN010077-003454-ExA.AS-25.D4.V1 EA1N&EA2***

### ***Applicants' Comments on SASES' Deadline 1 Submissions***

#### **Implications for landscape and visual impacts of the length of construction period**

1. In response to the issues that were raised with regard to the uncertainty of the length of the construction period should the two SPR substations be built consecutively, the *Applicants' Comments on SASES' Deadline 1 Submissions* refers (page 125) to EN010077-001534-6.3.29.5 EA1N ES Appendix 29.5 LVIA Cumulative Assessment. However that appendix which does not provide any detailed information about how the individual elements of the proposals would be scheduled. It merely states the adverse effects should the two substations be built consecutively would be medium term (5-10 years) rather than short term (1-4 years) if they were built concurrently.
2. It does not answer the following questions:
  - Is there a commitment (rather than just an assumption) that the construction of the NG substation (48 months) is concurrent with the SPR substation? If not the construction of just one SPR substation could result in medium term adverse impacts.
  - Is there any commitment to no delay between commencing construction on the first SPR substation and commencing construction on the 2nd?
3. Even if the construction of the 2nd SPR substation begins immediately the first one is completed the construction period and associated adverse impacts would be 5 years with a consequent five-year delay in the implementation of the bulk of the mitigation measures. If there is no commitment that there will be no delay between the construction of the two substations the construction period could theoretically be extended for 7½ years or more years. Effectively this means Yr 15 when planting is assumed to have established may be 22½ years after the start of construction

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4. As noted in *EN010077-003208-sases deadline 3 mb 1080 BN04 Landscape 151220* whilst the commitment to install the ducting for both projects at once along the cable route is welcomed no such commitment has been given with regard to the substations although it would clearly be a potential mitigation measure with regard to the adverse landscape and visual impacts at Friston. As a consequence, the uncertainty over both the length of the construction period and the date on which the vast majority of the mitigation planting can be implemented remains.

#### **RAG Assessment**

5. Throughout the *Applicants' Comments on SASES' Deadline 1 Submissions* there is an insistence that *'The RAG assessment does not, however, in itself identify the chosen onshore substation site. It was a tool that allowed sites to be compared and progressed to further assessment stages and considered holistically in terms of all environmental criteria.'* It is unclear on what basis the site selection was made if it was not based on the RAG assessment. The Connection and Infrastructure Options Note (CION) process does not include an adequate assessment of landscape and visual factors. The RAG assessment concluded the Friston site was less environmentally sensitive than the other sites considered and so it was chosen. As has been set out previously, that assessment was flawed.

#### **Influence of the existing transmission lines**

6. In *Applicants' Comments on SASES' Deadline 1 Submissions* there is a repeated insistence that the overhead transmission lines *'exert an important influence on the way that the landscape is experienced'* This was not the conclusion of the LVIA. The LVIA describes the pylons as *'notable visual elements'* that *'tend to distort the sense of scale'* but nowhere does it suggest that they are the key characteristic exerting an important influence on the way that the landscape is experienced, of greater importance than other distinctive characteristics. Rather the LVIA describes the landscape as *'Quiet farmland, with a simple, rural character but a strong sense of agri-business land use evident amongst the medium to large fields towards Fristonmoor and Little Moor Farm.'*



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*EN010077-003433-ExA.AS-3.D4.V1 EA1N&EA2 Landscape and Visual Impact Assessment Addendum*

7. It is welcomed that the revised photomontages in the Appendices to the *Landscape and Visual Impact Assessment Addendum* now include an existing image that can easily be compared to the photomontages and that the overly optimistically 'early' planting has been omitted. It is a shame that the opportunity was not taken to revise the smooth green field with the newly planted whips/transplants in Vp 1 which, as pointed out at the ISH2, is quite unrealistic. Creating a more realistic image which acknowledged the likely soil conditions around the planting would not have been difficult. Vp 1 is also a very clear example of the limitation of the approach to showing just Yr 1 and Yr 15. The Yr 1 image is quite unrealistic and there is no real indication of how that viewpoint will look over the period that it will take for the planting to establish.
8. As previously stated, the loss of the open view across the landscape from Vp 1 has not been recognised in the assessment as an adverse impact. I do not agree with the conclusion that the magnitude of change on visual amenity at Yr 15 years is negligible and not significant.
9. The revised photomontages from Vp 5 which is presented on two frames now illustrates more clearly the impact of the development on the distinctive character of the landscape to the north of the village in which the presence of the church makes a significant contribution. The revised photomontages from Vp 5 illustrates how the landscape to the north of the substations will be severed from the village and there will be a total loss of the current relationship between this landscape and the village. The *Landscape and Visual Impact Assessment Addendum* accepts that the changes made during the examination process will not reduce the visual impact from this viewpoint or other viewpoints to the north. From Vp 5 the effect will remain significant, adverse and permanent.
10. In *Applicants' Comments on SASES' Deadline 1 Submissions* the applicants lists in a number of places (e.g. Page 148) the factors that they consider have reduced the visual impact of the development. Not listed is the rearrangement of elements within the substations. As set out in *EN010077-003522-sases deadline 4 Submission - Appendix 1 to Comments on Applicants' Deadline 3 Submissions* this accounts for some of the reduction in visual intrusion between the original photomontages and the revised photomontages in Vps 2 and 9. As the layout of the substations is not currently a controlled element of the DCO any improvement as a result of the rearrangement of equipment cannot be relied upon. If a specific arrangement is being relied upon to reduce visual intrusiveness there needs to be a specific requirement with regard to the layout.

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## Conclusion

11. Some of the Applicants' Comments on SASES' Deadline 1 Submissions relate to changes that have been made during the examination which have already been addressed in subsequent SASES submissions. It is not considered helpful to reiterate the points that have already been made but it is important to note that:

- I do not consider that the issues raised with the site selection process have been adequately answered and that I remain of the view that the RAG process which informed the choice of the site in Friston was misleading and failed to identify the key sensitivities of the landscape.
- I remain of the view that the LVIA is unhelpful in not identifying the level of adverse effects and relying simply on effects being significant or not significant.
- The reduction in footprint and a commitment to reduce the height of the equipment is welcomed, however the development would remain incongruous and out of scale with the receiving landscape.
- The changes would not be enough to significantly reduce the magnitude of change for either landscape or visual effects. Those effects which will remain as **major adverse** during construction and through Year 1 (potentially a six-year period or longer) only reducing to **moderate/major** at year 15, based on optimistic assumptions with regard to tree growth rates.