

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**To:** [East Anglia ONE North](#)  
**Subject:** PINS EA1(N) Hearings at Snape Maltings  
**Date:** 09 March 2020 20:54:47

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For the attention of the 'Case Team' / Rynd Smith

*My name is Alan Thomas – I am a resident of Friston and also a member of the SASES action group. I have registered as an Interested Party for both DCO applications. I wish to attend the Preliminary Meeting on Tuesday 24 March, the Issue Specific Hearings on Wednesday 25 March and the Open Floor Hearing on Thursday 26 March. My registration ID is 20024089 & 20024090. My concerns, as outlined below are equally applicable to both DCO submissions. If time permits I should like to present the following:*

### **Public Safety**

Like many in this quiet area of Suffolk, I have concerns regarding the sheer size of the development, its location, the impact of increased traffic, the intrusion of unwanted noise and light pollution and the overall public safety of residents. These points will be covered by other Interested Parties and I shall confine my comments to the matter of public safety.

By any measure, this development will be a large civil engineering undertaking, and as such, the applicant should have provided a concise and stand-alone Safety Case for both the offshore and onshore activities. It has not. Out of the 600 plus documents registered for each DCO application, just one, which is entitled "Safety Zone Statement" is specific to the subject of safety. This slim volume is solely concerned with the establishment of safety working zones around the wind turbines. There is no comparable volume addressing specifically the subject of onshore safety. Chapter 27 addresses at length Human Health, but nowhere does the concept of safety of the workforce or of local residents appear.

--[if !supportLists]-->• <!--[endif]-->The construction phase will involve tens of thousands of vehicle movements along and across narrow public roads and footpaths over a period that may last between 4 and 8 years. Chapter 26 of the Environmental Statement contains a highly formulaic analysis of recent Road Traffic Accidents, but the applicant has not quantified in numerical terms the likely increase death or injury directly attributable the additional road traffic. Descriptors like "Minor Adverse" have no meaning to the general public.

--[if !supportLists]-->• <!--[endif]-->There is no estimate provided of the likely level of workplace injury, which may burden the local health care system.

--[if !supportLists]-->• <!--[endif]-->The operational life of the substation(s) may be in excess of 30 years, but no safety case is provided for either the SPR substation(s) or that of the National Grid substation. Each SPR substation will each be capable of handling more than 800 MW of electrical power and the National Grid substation twice that. A one-second short circuit in a High Voltage transformer, switchgear or one of the major reactive components could result in the release of 400MJ of energy into the immediate area. For comparison this is equivalent to about 40 kg of modern high explosive.

--[if !supportLists]-->• <!--[endif]-->Fire and explosion is not an unknown hazard at electricity substations across the world. SPR have not provided any evidence that this aspect has been seriously considered. There is no quantification of the risk within the documentation nor

any evidence of contingent plans for how the Applicant would manage such situations. Blast walls are briefly referred to in a very detailed spreadsheet relating to delivery of construction material. The developer has not supplied any analysis of risk-outcome regarding blast or a safety trace of any debris field.

--[if !supportLists]-->• <!--[endif]-->Within the documentation there is passing reference to COMAH regulations, that is Control of Major Accident Hazard, but there is no sign of a Credible Accident Assessment, which should be standard practice for a project of this size.

--[if !supportLists]-->• <!--[endif]-->Friston lies within an evacuation zone for the Sizewell B Nuclear Facility. There is no evidence that the Applicant has considered how his undertaking could impact such planning.

--[if !supportLists]-->• <!--[endif]-->The Application indicates the use of Gas Insulated Switchgear. Current practice employs sulphur-hexafluoride, which is a heavy and suffocating (but non-toxic) gas. It is also a potent 'greenhouse' gas and use in windfarms is being actively discouraged. The DCO submission does not include any statement on the management of accidental leaks.