Wylfa Newydd Nuclear Power Station

The views expressed in this page do not represent those of the Planning Inspectorate. This page consists of content submitted to the Planning Inspectorate by the public and other interested parties, giving their views of this proposal.

Wylfa Newydd Nuclear Power Station

Received 13 August 2018
From Austrian Institute of Ecology


Request: The missing assessment of alternatives for the EIA Wylfa should be conducted from an environmental perspective, and the future need of electricity production should be declared.

Request: The potential rise of the sea level caused by climate change can result in a higher risk of flood and coastal erosion than assumed in the National Nuclear Policy. This risk has to be assessed using new facts and knowledge on climate change, and also updated regularly over the whole lifetime of NPP and radioactive waste facilities at the site.

It is not clear why this reactor type (UK ABRW) was chosen. Request: An assessment of different reactor types from an environmental point of view should be presented in the EIA, including a description of the method of decision.

The source term for the analysed severe accident scenario is 1.86E+08 Bq Cs-137. Such a release of Cs-137 seems to be very low for the biggest severe accident one can think of. In comparison: In the still ongoing EIA for the new NPP in Dukovany/CZ a release of Cs-137 for a severe accident with core-melt is assumed to be maximal 30 TBq. Moreover, a containment failure cannot be completely excluded without a “residual risk”, especially when regarding the performances of ABWRs in operation or in construction. In case of containment failure of an ABWR a study of BOKU Wien assessed that up to 294 PBq Cs-137 could be released in the environment.
The project flexRISK presents dispersion calculations for such a release and results in a possible contamination of Austrian territory with several 100 kBq Cs-137/m2 depending on the weather situation. This is more than the contamination in Austria after Chernobyl. Moreover, in Austria, agricultural countermeasures have to start at an expected contamination with Cs-137 of 0.65 kBq/m2. Austria therefore can be severely impacted by the project. In case of a severe accident in Wylfa with a containment failure, whole of Europe could be contaminated severely.
Request: Any new NPP in UK needs to prove that a severe accident with a containment failure is not possible.
Request: If an accident happens, it has to be guaranteed that the full damage will be covered.

Request: In the documentation it should be explained what consequences the Brexit will have on the whole project.

Request: For every new NPP the safe disposal of all spent fuel and radioactive waste has to be proven in an EIA. It is not enough to present only plans for future disposals, especially if no functioning solutions for final disposals exist anywhere in this world.